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In this  study  we test for oligopsony  power  of  the pulp  industry  over the Finnish pulpwood  
market using  the method introduced by  Appelbaum.  The  method applies duality  to  derive a 
factor demand system  from which the markdown of the pulpwood market  price  from the 
value of its marginal  product  is  statistically  estimated. Our  empirical  estimates assuming  
constant  market power  suggest  that  the pulpwood  market  in Finland have on the average been 
competitive  during  the period.  However, some evidence is  found that wood chips  purchased  
from sawmills have been priced  below the value of  their marginal  product.  This result is 
intuitively  plausible  due to  the lack  of  countervailing  power  of the sawmilling  industry as  
compared  to  suppliers  of  roundwood in  the pulpwood  market.  
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Yhteenveto: 
Ostajapuolen  markkinavoiman  testaaminen  Suomen  kuitupuumarkkinoilla  
Puumarkkinoiden rakenne  on  Suomessa epäsymmetrinen,  vähän suuria  ostajia  suhteessa 
pieniin  myyjiin.  Ostajien  keskittyminen  on  metsäteollisuuden yritysfuusioiden  takia viimeisen 
vuosikymmenen  aikana lisääntynyt.  Raakapuumarkkinoiden  rakenne viittaa epätäydelliseen  
kilpailuun  markkinoilla. Sitä, tukeeko markkinahintojen  määräytyminen  epätäydellisen  
kilpailun  oletusta ei ole Suomea koskevalla  aineistolla tutkittu vaan aiemmissa empiiriissä  
malleissa on  pääsääntöisesti  lähdetty  oletuksesta etta kantohintojen  muodostumista kuvaa 
kilpailevien  markkinoiden malli. Tällöin puun kysyntä  ja tarjonta määräävät sekä  
markkinahinnan että vaihdetun puumäärän.  
Taloustieteessä markkinaa, jolla on paljon  myyjiä  ja vähän ostajia kutsutaan  
oligopsoniksi.  1980-luvulle asti toimialan taloustieteessä vallinnut Structure-Conduct- 
Performance-paradigma  (SCPP)  perustui  pitkälti  markkinoiden rakenteeseen kilpailua  
ilmentävänä tekijänä.  Nykyisin  vallalla oleva toimialan taloustieteen suuntaus, niin kutsuttu  
New Empirical  Industrial Organization (NEIO) sen  sijaan  painottaa  markkinoiden 
ekonometrista analyysia  kilpailullisuuden  tutkimisessa. Empiirisissä  oligopolimalleissa  
estimoidaan ekonometriseen malliin parametri,  joka kuvaa toimialan keskimääräistä  
markkinavoimaa, ja testataan  sen ominaisuuksia tilastollisesti. 
Tässä tutkimuksessa Suomen kuitupuumarkkinoihin sovelletaan ns.  
duaalilähestymistapaa  (Appelbaum 1982), jossa teollisuuden oligopsonivoimaa  arvioidaan 
estimoimalla tuotantopanosten kysyntäyhtälösysteemi  ja testaamalla onko kuitupuun  
rajatuottavuus  ollut markkinahintaa korkeampi.  Jos markkinahinta on alhaisempi  kuin 
panoksen  rajatuottavuus,  on tämä osoitus teollisuuden käyttämästä  markkinavoimasta. 
Aineistona on toimialatason aikasarja-aineisto  vuosilta 1965-94. 
Käytettäessä  oletusta että teollisuuden markkinavoima on  vakio yli ajan saadaan 
tulokseksi se että  kuitupuun  hinta Suomessa on  ollut keskimäärin lähellä kilpailevien  
markkinoiden hintatasoa. Sen  sijaan  estimoitaessa ostajien  markkinavoimaa sahateollisuuden 
hakkeen hinnan suhteen saadaan viitteitä epätäydellisestä  kilpailusta  markkinoilla. Yhtenä 
syynä  siihen,  ettei metsäteollisuus olisi pystynyt  hyödyntämään  rakenteesta johtuvaa  
markkinavoimaa kuitupuumarkkinoilla,  arvioidaan olevan hintaodotusten keskeisen  aseman  
puun tarjonnassa.  Mikäli metsänomistaja  odottaa kantohintojen  nousevan,  hän voi lykätä  
myyntipäätöstään,  jolloin  toteutuva  markkinahinta lähenee kilpailevien  markkinoiden tasoa.  
Hakemarkkinoilta tällainen mekanismi puuttuu,  sillä itsenäinen sahateollisuus on  varsin 
riippuvainen  sivutuloistaan hakkeen myynnistä.  
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1.  Introduction 
In recent  decades  both stumpage prices  and wood quantities  in the Finnish  roundwood market 
have fluctuated widely  over  the  business  cycle. The market is  characterized by  a pronounced  
structural asymmetry  and a  small number of  wood buyers,  in contrast  to  the over  300 000 
nonindustrial private  forest  owners.
1 Buyer  concentration has  increased due to mergers and 
acquisitions  in the  forest industry,  especially  in the last  decade. Currently  the three largest  
buyers  dominate both the pulpwood  and sawlog  markets. The  sawlog  market is however 
characterized by a competitive  fringe of numerous small sawmills. For  pulpwood,  this  
competitive  fringe does not exist. The large  forest industry  companies  also import a 
substantial  amount  of  pulpwood  to  Finland,  roughly  one sixth  of the total consumption  of 
industrial roundwood in  1996. 
Due to  increased buyer  concentration,  the Finnish  roundwood market has often been  
suspected  of being  imperfectly  competitive.  However, most econometric models of Finnish 
sawlog  and pulpwood  markets have assumed  competitive  behaviour and have described the 
market quite well (see e.g. Kuuluvainen et ai. 1988, Hetemäki and Kuuluvainen 1992, 
Toppinen  and Kuuluvainen 1997). Empirical evidence on testing the market being  
competitive  is  by  and large nonexistent. In this paper we aim to fill this gap  by modelling  the 
Finnish pulpwood  market as  an oligopsony,  i.e. a  market with few buyers  and many sellers. 
In an oligopsony  pulpwood  market,  the buyer  side may have market power over  the 
suppliers of wood. This market power would result in a wood price  level lower than that in a  
'  Between  1978  and  1991  a nationwide  collective  bargaining system  including representative  organisations  of 
the  forest  industry  and  private  forest  owners set  recommendations  for  stumpage prices  (and starting  from 1984  
also  for  wood  quantities) from private  forests  for  each  felling season.  Due to  developments in  the  economic  
environment, more precisely  the  new competition law  in  1992, and  the  fact  that  Finland  joined the  EU  in  1994, 
this  bargaining system was  prohibited due  to  its noncompetitiveness. Currently,  individual  forest industry  
companies and  representatives  of forest  owners meet  to  discuss  on stumpage  price  expectations for  the  next  
felling season. On empirical  results based  on the  game-theoretic bargaining approach in  pulpwood price  and  
demand determination, see however  Koskela  and Ollikainen  (1996). 
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competitive  wood market. Consequently,  the wood buyers  would gain  a  positive markup  (or  
actually  markdown, since  we are  dealing  with an input  market distortion)  with the value of  
the marginal  product  for pulpwood  exceeding  the market  price  for pulpwood.  If buyers  act  
collectively  as  a  purchasing  cartel,  the market could even  function as a  monopsony. If  there is  
oligopsony  power  in the pulpwood  market,  it  could mean a  welfare transfer from suppliers  to  
buyers  of  wood, and  it  could have an  effect  on  the sizes  of  different wood using  industries. 
The contribution of this paper is the explicit  testing  of a potential  deviation from 
competitive  pricing  in the Finnish pulpwood  market. Using the method introduced by  
Appelbaum  (1979,  1982) and further developed by  Atkinson  and Kerkvliet (1989)  and 
Bergman  and Brännlund (1995), we apply  duality  to derive a factor demand system  from 
which the markdown of the pulpwood  price  from the value of its marginal  product is  
statistically  estimated. The estimable factor  demand system  used in this  study  is  based  on a  
flexible functional form. In this respect,  the paper can also be seen as  an extension of  
Hetemaki's (1990)  factor  demand model for  the Finnish pulp  and  paper industry,  in  which the 
wood input  price  is  treated as  exogenous to  industry.  
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2.  Theoretical background  and previous  studies  
The theoretical framework for this study  has been presented  in the industrial organization  
literature (see  e.g.  Tirole 1988).  Before the 1980  s,  the dominant approach  was  the structure  
conduct-performance  paradigm  (SCPP),  which tried to  establish a  direct link from  industry  
structure  to conduct,  so that the level of competition  could be implied  by an industry's  
structural features. However, the SCPP was  criticized later on because  the relationship  
between industry  structure  and conduct is  not  unambiguously  predicted  by  the theory  of  
imperfect  competition,  i.e.  high  concentration in an industry  does not  necessarily  imply  
noncompetitive  behaviour. With the current  methodology  of the new empirical  industrial 
organization  (NEIO), the existence  of market  power can be studied  more rigorously  than 
before. 
In NEIO, the degree of competition  is typically  analysed  via the estimation of 
conjectural  elasticities.  These elasticities are  computed  as  
where Q denotes industry  output  (or  demand for oligopsonistic  input)  and q is the output 
(input)  of i'th firm. 0'  measures the firm's expectation  of the industry  output change  in 
response  to  its  output  change  or  alternatively, it can be  simply  interpreted  as  an index of  
market  power. A comprehensive  structural model for estimating  the degree  of market  power 
in oligopolistic  markets  was  introduced in Appelbaum  (1982),  and  this  method can  be  applied  
to  input  markets  as  well.
2 
2  Appelbaum (1979) also  presents  a test  for  monopolistic  behaviour  through estimating  and  testing for  the  
significance of  the  markup term using the  /-test.  The  null  hypothesis  is  the existence of a  competitive  market, 
and  thus a non-zero markup term indicates  that  competition can  be  rejected.  
(1) Q'=(dQ/dq')(q'/Q),  
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Numerous empirical  applications  of estimation and testing  of market power  can  be found. 
Bresnahan (1989)  and  Slade (1995)  provide  surveys  of  these studies.  Examples  of  studies  that 
consider market power  in output  markets  are  Appelbaum  (1982)  and Bernstein and Mohnen 
(1991)  for manufacturing  industries, and  Scroeter  (1988)  and Scroeter  and  Azzam (1990)  for 
agricultural product  markets.  Input  market distortions are  considered e.g.  by  Just  and  Chern 
(1980),  Love and Murningtyas  (1992),  Bergman  and Brännlund (1995),  and Murray (1995),  
of which the latter two  consider wood markets.  Applications  involving  both  input  and output  
markets include Atkinson and Kerkvliet  (1989)  for the U.S. electricial utility industry, Wann 
and Sexton (1992)  for the California food industry,  and Bernstein (1992)  for the Canadian 
forest  industries. 
Bergman  and  Brännlund (1995)  tested the oligopsony  hypothesis  for the Swedish 
pulpwood  market,  and  their empirical  results  indicated a  competitive  pulpwood  market under 
a  constant  degree  of  market  power,  but a  noncompetitive  pulpwood  market under a  variable 
degree  of market power3.  Murray  (1995)  studied market power in both the pulpwood  and 
sawlog  markets  in the U.S.  He modelled wood as  a  quasi-fixed  factor, so that the shadow  
prices of  the wood input  could be  estimated from a  flexible-form profit  function. His  results  
suggested  that the U.S.  pulpwood  market as  a  whole is  more oligopsonistic  than the sawlog  
market,  although  both markets  were  closer to perfect  competition  than to  monopsony. In 
contrast  to  the two above-mentioned wood market studies,  Bernstein (1992)  accounted for 
capital  adjustment  costs in the Canadian sawmill and pulp  and  paper industries,  and accepted  
competitive  behaviour both in the input  markets  for  wood and  pulp  and  the output markets  for 
sawnwood and paper products.  
3  Estimates of  a  strongly  time-varying  conjectural  elasticity  term  in  Bergman and  Brännlund  (1995) point  to  an 
unstable  cartel  situation  with  phases of strong cartel  under  weak  pulp markets  and perfect  competition under  
strong pulp markets,  which  is  an intuitively plausible  explanation of the  cyclical  wood  markets.  
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3.  The model and econometric  specification  
Let  us consider an individual firm in an n-firm oligopsonistic  industry.  Following  notation in 
Bergman  & Brännlund (1995),  we  write the twice continuously  differentiable production  
function of firm i in implicit  form  as 
where q is  the firm's output quantity,  x' is  a  vector  of  inputs  with a  parametric  price  vector  
w,  and  x
m
 is  the input  of factor  m which is  used only  by  the firm and its  rivals.  Assume that 
for input  m the industry  faces an inverse  supply  function 
where w
m
 is  the price,  x
m
 is  supply  (awJox
m
 > 0),  and y a vector of  exogenous variables 
affecting  the supply.  In equilibrium, the supply  x
m
 equals  the industry's  demand for that 
input.  Let us  assume  that the firm maximizes its profit  by  choosing  inputs  x
m
 and x' .  
Denoting  the output  price by  w
()
,
 the problem  of  firm i  is:  
The  optimality condition for profit maximization requires  that the marginal  product  value of 
an input  is  equal  to  the perceived  marginal cost of an input.  For  inputs  with parametric  price,  
this yields  the equation  
(2)  q'  =/(*:,*'), 
(3) w,,=wjx
m
,y),  
(4) Max
xi
 
r
f(x'
m
,x')-w
n
(x
m
,y)x'
m
-w
T
x'.  
m'  
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Assume that the firm  realizes that since its use  of  input  m,  x'
m,
 forms an important  part  of the 
total  demand for the input,  x
m
,  its  input  decision has  an  impact  on price  w
m
.  Let  us denote the 
supply  elasticity  of the input  price  (dwJdx
m
)(  xjwj  by  7. Firm i may  also  conjecture  that its  
input  decision affects  its  rivals'  input  decisions. Let  us  denote this  conjectural  elasticity  (dxJd  
x'jxjxj  by  o'.  For  a  monopsonist,  0'  equals  one,  and for a  firm that takes input  price  as  
given  0'  equals  zero.  Using  the notation above,  we  can  write  the optimality  condition for  input  
demand x'
m
 as  
Due to a lack  of data on individual firms,  we must  make some  restrictive  assumptions  to 
enable aggregation  of the firms in order to perform our analysis  using  industry-level  data. 
One possibility  is  to assume that 0 is  the same for  all the firms, so  that all the firms face 
identical marginal  prices.  On  the other  hand,  if  we assume  that the marginal  product  of  input  
m is  the same  for  all the n firms in the industry,  then equation  (6)  implies that in equilibrium  
6  is  the same for  all the firms. We will make the former assumption,  and denote the common 
conjectural  variations parameter by  9. 
Using  the equilibrium  values for inputs  and outputs,  the industry  shadow price 
variable profit function, 77, can be formed as a linear aggregate of the individual firm's 
shadow price variable  profit  functions: 
(5)  w
i
y„
i
f(x'
m
,x')  =  w. 
(6) w
p
df /dx'
m
 =  w
m
(l  +  d'y). 
10 
where q(.) is the industry  equilibrium  output,  and  x
m
 and x  are  the industry  equilibrium  inputs  
with (shadow)  prices  w m (l  +  By)  and vv  respectively.  Applying  Hotelling's  Lemma in terms 
of shadow prices to  equation  (7),  the output supply  and input  demand equations  for the 
industry  can  be solved respectively  as
4 
In the econometric application  we assume that the Finnish pulp  industry uses  two  
variable inputs,  wood and  labour,  together  with a  quasi-fixed  capital  input  in order  to  produce  
one output,  pulp,  which is  sold in competitive  world markets.  This  framework allows for the  
possibility  that the industry  is  not  in long-run  equilibrium.  To account  for technological  
change, time enters the estimable equations  as a fixed input. In an alternative model 
specification,  we  follow Murray  (1995)  and  experiment  with the assumption  of  a  quasi-fixed  
wood input,  although  we argue that  it is  a priori  more reasonable to  assume  that wood is  a  
4  Note  that  by  replacing  the  actual  prices in  the  initial  maximum  value  profit  function  by the  respective  shadow  
prices,  we get a  maximum  value  profit  function  for  the  competitive  industry  that  optimises  with  respect  to  the  
parametric  shadow  prices.  At  the  point  of  the  oligopsonistic  industry's  equilibrium,  with  price  W*  (\  +  G'y)  
n— vv q(w ,w
m
( 1  +  dy),  vv)  -  w„,(  1  +  dy)  ■  x
m
(w  
,
 w
m
(l  +  dy),  w) 
(7)
_
 
-  wx(w
11
,w
nl
(\  +  Oy),w),  
(8) —-q{wp,wm{ \  + 9y),w) 
uWp 
eTI 
V) T~7i
——
 = -Mwi-,wm(\ +  9y),w)  
dwm(l+&y)  
(10) = -x(wp,wm(\  + &y),w). 
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flexible input,  compared  e.g. with  labour. We based the estimable system  on a generalized  
Leontief (GL)  profit function,  which  is  a  flexible functional form. This  form allows  us  to  avoid 
placing  a priori constraints on  the second  derivatives of  the profit  function. 
Let  Z  be an «-vector  of the (quasi)  fixed inputs  and w"  an m-vector  of  shadow prices  
for output and variable inputs.  Assuming  a  noncompetitively  priced  wood input,  the shadow  
price of wood accommodates  the markdown term (1 +  yö), where 6 denotes the industry  
conjectural  variations elasticity  and  y  denotes the supply  elasticity  of the wood price. For  the 
other inputs  and for the output,  shadow prices  equal  market  price. The chosen  GL 
specification  for  the industrial shadow price variable profit  function,  Tl(w
s
 ,Z)
,
 is 
where /?.. <p..,  as  well  as  the parameters  y  and 9in the shadow price  of wood, are  estimable 
parameters. For  symmetry  of  the profit  function,  we  impose  the  restrictions  /3.  =  ft., and ty..  
The shadow profit defined in Equation (11) may not  be observed,  but applying  
Hotelling's  Lemma on shadow prices,  we  obtain the estimable equations  for  output q and for 
the demand for variable factors  x„  
tor  the  oligopsonistic input, the  output and  input levels  chosen by  a competitive industry are identical  to  those  
chosen  by  a  noncompetitive industry  facing  an  input  price  equal to  w'
m
.  
m m n n m n 
(11) n(w\z)  =XI I  tt
y
z.z.+£  I  o..w;z  
I 7 
J i j J i j J J 
O 2) q - X"'  AAw'i I WX
5
 +X"  K Zi  
(13)  -x,  =  Y"j  Pii  K:  1  w 'i  )°'
5
 +S] 0//z;  •  
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For  fixed inputs,  i  ,we  obtain equations  for  their shadow  prices,  A,: 
Assuming roundwood input  to  be freely adjustable,  the estimable system  consists  of  
equation  (12)  for pulp  output and equations  (13)  for wood and labour  input.  When the wood 
input  is  assumed  to be  quasi-fixed,  the shadow profit  equals  the observed  actual  profit  and  the 
estimable system  consists  of  equation  (11)  for profit,  equation  (12)  for pulp  output, and 
equation  (13)  for labour input.  The shadow price for  wood can then  be calculated from the 
obtained parameter estimates  using  equation  (14).  
When the factor demand system  is estimated simultaneously  with  the wood supply  
equation  (3),  it is  possible  to  separate the supply  elasticity  of wood price,  y, from  the 
conjectural  elasticity  term, 0.  For  domestic pulpwood,  simultaneous estimation  of the supply  
elasticity  was attempted. But due to convergence problems  caused by nonlinearities in the 
model system  and to the wrong sign  obtained for the pulpwood  supply  elasticity,  this 
approach  could not  be  used.
5  Moreover,  because  of a  lack  of data, this  procedure  could  not be 
used for modelling  the supply of  wood imports or  wood chips  coming  from the sawmilling  
industry,  of  which both are  important raw  material sources  for  the Finnish  pulp  industry. 
However,  it is  justifiable  to  assume  that the supply  elasticities of all these  alternative sources  
of the wood input  are finite. Earlier roundwood market  studies  that assume competitive 
markets,  suggest that  the elasticity  of the stumpage price  of pulpwood  with respect  to supply 
(i.e. the inverse price elasticity)  lies between 1.0 and 2.0  (e.g. Kuuluvainen et ai. 1988, 
Toppinen  & Kuuluvainen 1997). 
(14) =Yj 2*JZJ-  
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Nevertheless,  since our  purpose  was  to test  the pricing  rule,  we chose to  treat the 
mark-down term for  the wood price  (1  +  yd)  as  a  single  parameter,  %,  in our  empirical  model. 
Therefore,  an estimate for  %  that  is  greater than 1 indicates deviation from competitive  wood  
pricing. The measure  of actual oligopsony  power, which can also be interpreted  as the input  
market counterpart  to the Lerner index, L,  can be calculated from the estimate for % as  
Lsx-l = ye. 
5  One reason for  these  estimation  problems  could  be  the  fact  that  private  forest  owners account  for  only  about  a 
half  of the  roundwood  quantity  used in  the  Finnish  pulp  industry and  thus the  utility maximing behavioural  
model  lor  NIPFs is not well  suited  to our case. 
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4. Time  series  data 
The model was estimated using  annual data for Finland for the period  1965 to  1994 (for 
graphs  of the main variables  see  Appendix  1). In measuring  wood price  and wood input,a  
number of factors  should be  taken into account. Most importantly,  the  pulp  industry  not  only 
uses  domestic pulpwood,  but  also  imported  pulpwood  and wood chips  purchased  from the 
sawmilling industry.  Imported roundwood comes  mainly  from Russia,  and  up to  late 1980 s  a  
large  share of wood imports  was based on  bilateral trade  agreements between Finland and  the 
former Soviet Union. This suggests  that wood imports  have not  necessarily  always  been 
adjustable  to actual  business  conditions in the forest  industry.  
During  the study  period the average share of wood chips  in total  wood input  for  pulp  
production  has been  close to one  fifth. However,  the market for wood chips  is  not  well 
defined,  as  a  major  part  of  chips  are obtained as  a  by-product  from sawmills  owned by  the 
companies that also produce  pulp.  The availability  of residual wood varies annually,  
depending  on  business  conditions in the sawmilling  industry,  which do not  always  coincide 
with business  cycles  in the pulp  industry.  Moreover,  wood chips  do  not  allow for a long  
storage period  before pulping,  whereas the wood buyer  in the pulpwood  stumpage  market can 
postpone felling up to two years after purchasing  the wood. Although  wood chips  are  
substitutes for  roundwood, difference in the quality  of the two  inputs  in pulp production  is  an 
open question.  
All the three types of wood, i.e. wood chips,  domestic pulpwood  and imported  
pulpwood,  have  their own unique  price  developments  during the study  period.  Price  
differences may  be due to  the fact  that the  inputs  are  not  perfect  substitutes or  that the inputs  
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differ  in other respects  that may affect  the price,  e.g.  availability  and  terms  of  trade.6  But  the 
differences may also be a  sign  of imperfectly  competitive  markets,  with  suppliers  being  in 
different positions  in  negotiating  vis-a-vis  over  the prices  of their products. Despite  the 
quality differences,  one would expect  that the price  difference between roundwood and wood 
chips  would have been relatively  stable,  but  this  has  not  been  the case. The cost  of domestic 
roundwood has always  exceeded the price  of wood chips.  
The domestic roundwood price that we used is  the value of  domestic pulpwood  input  
in the pulp and  paper industry  divided by  the domestic  pulpwood  quantity,  i.e.  the mill price  
as obtained from the Industrial Statistics.  This  pulpwood  mill price  consists  of a  rather  highly  
variable stumpage price  component  and  a  relatively  stable harvesting  and transportation  cost  
component. The unit  price of imported  pulpwood  (CIF)  is  the value  of  imports  divided by  the 
quantity of imports. For  wood chips,  no actual prices  were available. Therefore we  had to  use  
the recommended price  for  wood chips  at  Kotka  harbour up to  the year 1986 (from  Hetemäki 
1990),  and  the price  reported  by  a  representative  forest  industry  company thereafter. The low 
quality  of the  wood chip price data must  be borne in mind when comparing  results from 
alternative models. 
Due to  data limitations,  we assume that although  the quality  of chips  and  roundwood 
may vary, wood inputs  from the three different sources  are (perfect)  substitutes. The wood 
input  used in the study  is  therefore the total amount  of domestic and imported  primary  
pulpwood,  and wood chips  consumed in the pulp  industry.  As  to prices,  we  will experiment  
with prices of  both wood chips  and  domestic  roundwood as a  representative  wood price. The 
firms  in the forest industry  are  assumed to use  market prices  as a basis  for their  internal 
transfers of wood and chips.  
6  Correlations  between  all quantity series  of  wood  input and  pulp output are high.  The  total wood  input,  
including pulpwood and  wood  chips,  has  a correlation  coefficient  of  0.99  with  pulp  output.  The  correlation  
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The pulp  price  is  the quantity-weighted  export  price  (FOB) of mechanical and 
chemical pulp. The  measure  of  pulp quantity  is  the sum  of the Finnish output of mechanical 
and chemical wood pulp. The labour input  is  the total number of working  hours in the pulp 
industry  provided  by  the Statistics  Finland. This was  not  as such  available for  the years 1986 
1994, as  integrated  pulp  and  paper production  were  aggregated  in the Industrial Statistics  for 
those years. Working hours in pulp production  were  separated  from the total  working  hours 
in integrated  pulp  and  paper production  by  extrapolating  from  past  developments  in the pulp  
and paper industry,  accounting  also  for the greater  knowhow of typical  labour inputs in the 
pulp  mills today.  Wage  cost  is  the total sum  of wages and  social  security  costs  in the pulp  and 
paper industry  divided by  the total number of  working  hours. 
The National Accounts  provide  an updated  series  for the net  stock of  capital  for the 
aggregate of pulp,  paper  and  paper products.  We separated  the capital  stock  for  pulp  from the 
total capital  stock  for  the pulp,  paper and  paperboard  industries, using  share  weights  obtained 
from the respective  (older) series  of Industrial  Statistics.  Again,  this method was  only  
applicable  up to  the year 1985. For  the rest  of  the observations,  the production  capacity  for 
pulp  and  paper was  used as  a  reference for separating  the net  stock of pulp from the aggregate 
capital  stock.  However, due to  high  correlation between the capital  stock series  for the pulp 
and paper industry  and  for the pulp  industry  alone,  the choice between the two  capital  stock  
values should not  make a difference in estimation. 
between  pulp output and  domestic  pulpwood input  alone  have  a correlation  of 0.73, while  the  correlation  
between  pulp output and  the  sum of domestic  and  imported roundwood  is  0.94.  
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5. Estimation results  
The model was estimated using  Zellner's iterative seemingly  unrelated regression  method. 
All  the equations  were  estimated in a stochastic  form with additive disturbance terms. We 
considered two  alternative cases: the total wood  input  being  flexible (Models  A, B, C) and the 
total wood input being  quasi-fixed (Model  D). In Model A imperfect  competition  was 
allowed in the pulpwood market,  while in Model B it was  allowed in the market for wood 
chips.  To avoid having  the estimable parameter appear under the square root  sign,  we  
introduced the  estimable parameter  for-Jx  ,  and  used  its  square  as  %  in  our  estimations. 
Let us  first  consider the models with flexible wood input  since we think it is  the more  
realistic assumption  in  modelling  demand for  wood. First  we assumed that the pulp  industry  
uses  all the wood imports  and wood chips  that are  available to  it in a  given year and that it 
buys  the additional wood from private  forests.  Hence the variable part of wood input is 
domestic roundwood,  for which the wood from alternative sources  is a perfect  substitute.  
Domestic pulpwood  price was  used as  the representative  wood price  in the estimable system  
(Model  A).  Then we  estimated the same system  using  the wood chip price  as  a  representative  
wood price  (Model  B).  Here  we  assumed that the pulp  industry  purchases  its pulpwood  before 
it knows the quantity  of wood chips  available and then  buys  the available wood chips  from 
the sawmills. 
In Table 1  most  of  the parameters  in both models  A and B were  significant  and the 
test  statistics  for the two  models did not  differ  markedly.  Many  of  the cross-price  parameters  
were  significant,  which suggests  that Cobb-Douglas  technology  is  not  a  good  description of  
the wood pulp  industry.  
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Table 1. Parameter estimates for alternative iterative seemingly  unrelated regression  models, 
(t-values  in parentheses)  The subscripts  are: q for pulp,  l for labor, w for wood, T for 
technological  change,  and K  for capital.  
In  model  A  a  significant  estimate,  0.99,  is  obtained for-Jx  
,
 and  the  Wald test  supports  the 
restriction ~Jx  =  1  with  a  probability  of 0.97.  Hence,  the  result  suggests  that  the pulpwood  
market has been competitive  if the wood price at the margin has been determined in the  
Pulpwood  price  Residual wood Pulpwood  price Wood quasi- 
price fixed 
A B C D 
Imperfect  Imperfect  Perfect 
competition  competition  competition 
%=free %=free x=i  
■fx  0.99 (6.53)  1.21 (7.51) 
-  -  
p  6.75 (6.40)  5.96 (9.28) 5.90 (10.79)  -0.70 (-2.84)  
(C -29.87 (-5.50)  -20.12 (-4.23) -27.42 (-5.53)  -23.4 (-5.52)  
p  -9.89 (-1.98) -12.50 (-3.71)  -4.48 (-1.53) 
K -2.36 (-4.48) -3.29 (-4.95) -2.43 (-4.64)  -1.63 (-3.55) 
p. 7.16 (4.75)  9.22 (5.57)  6.71 (4.64) 
p
qw
 -4.96 (-2.46) -3.29 (-3.95)  -5.27 (-8.36)  
MTT 
-  -  
-4.75 (-2.88)  12.22 (2.13)  
Mtk  
-  -  0.00 (4.28)  0.01 (2.24)  
4*qK 0.00 (0.16)  0.00  (0.12)  0.00 (1.66)  0.00 (2.13)  
<t>
qT  
0.14 (5.11)  0.15 (5.66)  0.12 (4.75)  0.01 (1.34)  
<t>,K -0.00 (-7.13)  -0.00 (-7.34)  -0.00 (-7.80)  -0.00 (-3.68)  
*Kr 1.04 (10.26) 0.90 (10.07)  1.03 (11.05)  0.51 (5.63)  
*t*wT  -0.55 (-4.39) 
-0.63 (-5.26)  -0.44 (-3.97)  -3.82 (-2.46)  
*t\vK  -0.00 (-0.22) -0.00 (-0.36) -0.00 (-1.85)  -0.01 (-9.43)  
<L, 0.24 (26.35) 
<t>w,  0.27 (3.65) 
Equation: n -  — 0.79 (0.59)  0.86  (0.98) 
Adj.  R
2
(DW)  
Equation:  Q 0.78 (0.58)  0.78 (0.63)  0.77 (0.53)  0.99  (1.02) 
Adj. R
2
(DW) 
Equation:  -X
w
 0.73 (0.58)  0.72 (0.62)  0.71 (0.52)  -  
Adj.R
2
(DW) 
Equation:  -X
L
 0.97 (0.70)  0.97 (0.91)  0.97 (0.66) 0.95 (0.71)  
Adj.R
2
(DW)  
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domestic pulpwood  market. If the market has  been competitive  as  suggested  by model A, 
then the actual profits of the pulp  industry  coincide with the behavioural profit function,  as  
shadow prices for variable inputs  do not  differ  from observed prices  in a competitive  
industry.  We included shadow profit  (equation  11) in the estimable system  to check the 
sensitivity  of  the parameter estimates to the inclusion of  the variable profit  equation.  The 
estimate for the variable profit was  calculated from the price and  quantity data,  valuing  the 
alternative wood inputs  at their prices  and estimating  the model with % restricted  to one 
(Model  C).  The results were similar to  those of  the model A, as  can be seen  from Table l.7 
On the other hand,  model B suggests that if  industry  buys  wood chips  at the margin,  it 
marks  down their  price.  The estimate 1.21 was  obtained forjx  
,
 giving  x  an  approximate  
value  of  1 ,475.  The  obtained Wald-test probability  value  for  restriction  -Jx  =\  was  low,  only  
0.19. 
The own-  and cross-price  elasticities were  calculated at the mean of the variables for 
Models A-C.  All the models gave  roughly  similar elasticities,  of which those of Model C  are 
given in Table 2. All  the own-price  elasticities  were consistent with the theory  since they  
were  positive for pulp  output  and negative  for variable inputs.  All the elasticities were  less  
than one,  i.e. rather  small in absolute terms. For example,  the estimated own-price  elasticity  
for pulpwood  demand was  -0.25 and the own-price elasticity  of  pulp  supply  was 0.15. 
Labour input  was  found  to  be  a  complement  for wood input,  in contrast  to  Hetemäki (1990),  
who found that  labour was  a substitute for wood in 1960-86. 
7  In  order  to  examine  in  more  depth  the  substitution  between  roundwood  and  wood  chips, we  experimented  
with  a model  where  either  pulpwood  input or wood  chip  input alone  represented the flexible  wood  input.  The  
estimates  for % were less  than  one,  which  is  theoretically  incorrect  (0.42 in  the  first  case and  0.90  in  the  latter  
case). When  the  separate input demand  equation for  wood  chips  was  included  in  the  system  in  addition  to 
pulpwood input demand, none of the  parameters relating wood  chips  to  other  inputs and  output was significant. 
Separating the  inputs thus  clearly weakened  model  performance. 
8  It is  worth  recalling  that  the  low  quality  of  wood  chip  price  data may  have  an effect  on this  result  (Model  B).  
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Table 2. Elasticities  for model C, calculated at the mean of the variables. 
It  is  worth noting,  however, that the models suffer  from residual autocorrelation, as  indicated 
by  the low Durbin-Watson statistics.  There is  also  a  problem  with  the unexplained  variation 
in the wood demand equation,  which seems  to arise  mainly  from the wide price  and  quantity  
fluctuations in the mid-1970s (1975-77).  During  this period  pulp  production  and wood 
consumption  plummeted  at  very  high  price  levels  for  both pulp  and  pulpwood.  Using  separate  
dummies for these years  in model A,  the adjusted  R
2
 values were  markedly  higher in all the 
equations  of  Model A (estimation  results  in Appendix 2). Residual autocorrelation was 
slightly  reduced  as indicated by  the rise  in Durbin-Watson statistics. Most interestingly,  the 
inclusion  of dummies increased the  markdown term  in the  model A,  where Jx received  an 
estimate of 1.17. 
In models A and B the potential  markdown was assumed to be  constant  over  the 
examined time horizon. This assumption is rather restricting  and,  in addition to the static 
nature of the estimable system,  it  is one of the potential  reasons  for the diagnostic  problems  
with the system.  Unfortunately,  our experiments  using the time-varying  markdown 
parameter, consisting  of  exogenous variables as  in Bergman  & Brännlund (1995), failed to 
converge, and we  had to  settle for  the constant  index of  market  power. 
Pulp  price Wood cost Labor cost Capital  Technology  
stock  level  
Pulp  supply  0.15 -0.12 -0.03 0.20 0.27 
Wood demand 0.32 -0.25 -0.07 0.27 0.27 
Labor demand 0.29 -0.27 -0.03 0.48 0.28 
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However,  our  experiment  with  the assumption  of quasi-fixed  wood input,  following  
Murray (1995)  gives  some insight  for the question  of  how the market power  has  varied over 
time, as  the estimates for the shadow prices of wood can be calculated from the estimated 
parameters. The results are  reported  in connection with Model D. Now labour is the only  
variable input  in the model. This is a very extreme assumption,  and we used the value of 
wood costs  as  an additional proxy  for  the other variable costs  than labour to  be able to  obtain 
meaningful  results.  Thus,  we substracted the value of  wood costs from the calculated variable 
profit in the industry  and estimated a behavioural profit function together  with equations  for 
pulp  supply  and labour input.  Due  to  linear aggregation  of  the individual producers,  the 
coefficients (i
ww
 for  wood and |i
KK
 for capital  in Equation  (11)  were  restricted to  be zero.  For  
consistency  in aggregating  the firms' profit  functions to  form the industry  profit  function,  it 
had to  be assumed that the shadow prices  for the fixed inputs  do  not  depend  on the level of  
the fixed inputs  nor  thus on the allocation of  these inputs  between the firms.  
The estimation results from Model D indicated better in-sample  fit for the pulp  output 
and profit  equations  than in Model A. For  the output equation  this  can  be expected,  because 
the total wood input  was  among the variables explaining  pulp  output, and these two variables 
are  almost  one-to-one  correlated. The parameter  estimates  that were obtained from the three 
equations  were  used to  calculate shadow prices  for wood input  (Figure  1). 
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Figure  1. The prices of  pulpwood  and  wood chips  and the estimated shadow price  of  wood in 
pulp  production  (wood  as  a  quasi-fixed  input  from Model D)  in 1965-94,  FIM/m
3
. 
The resulting  shadow price  was  below the pulpwood  price  except  in four  early  periods,  while 
the wood chip  price seemed to form a lower bound for the shadow price estimates. This 
provides  support for the assumption  that wood chips  input  determines the shadow price  for 
wood in Model B. However, during the 1990  s the  calculated shadow price was negative,  
which clearly reduces  the reliability  of  Model D. 
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6.  Conclusions 
In this  paper  we  tested for  deviations from competitive  pricing  of  pulpwood  using  a  flexible 
functional form of factor  demand system  for the  aggregate Finnish pulp  industry  in 1965-94. 
Our empirical  estimates suggest  that the Finnish  pulpwood  market has on average been 
competitive  during  the period.  There is,  however,  some indication that wood chips  purchased  
from the sawmilling  industry  have been  priced  below the value of  their marginal  product.  
Provided that pulpwood  and wood chips  are  substitutes,  this  result  is  qualitatively  evident ex  
ante  since the  price of wood chips has  been constantly  lower than the pulpwood  price.  Since  
we deal with the aggregate pulpwood  market and time series  data,  noncompetitive  pulpwood  
pricing  at the local level or  over  shorter time periods  is  still possible.  
Most parameters of the models were statistically  significant,  and the signs  for own  
price  elasticities in the models were agreed  with the theory.  However,  the estimated models 
suffered from residual autocorrelation,  and  the results were  sensitive  to  having  all  data points  
of the observation  period included. Therefore one must be cautious with the conclusion 
regarding  the degree  of competition  in the pulpwood  market. Further  work, preferably  using  
other modelling  approaches,  is  necessary  to gain  more confidence in the robustness of these 
results. 
One possible  reason for residual autocorrelation in models with rather high 
explanatory  power  is  nonstationarity  of  individual time series.  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  unit 
root  tests (Dickey  and Fuller 1979) also  indicate that  at least two  endogenous  variables of the 
system, i.e. pulpwood  and  pulp  quantity,  may  in fact  be  nonstationary.  Unfortunately,  cross  
equation  restrictions make it difficult to accommodate nonstationarity  and possible  
cointegration  in a flexible functional form factor demand model. This approach  remains,  
however, as a  possible  way  to extend this research  (see also  Aiginger  et  al. 1995). 
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Although  the strong asymmetry  of  the Finnish  pulpwood  market suggests imperfect  
competition,  our  results  in support of a  competitive market or weak  oligopsony  power  are 
nevertheless plausible.  As  concluded by Bergman  (1993)  for the Swedish roundwood 
markets, the input  market counterpart of  the so-called Coase conjecture  (Coase  1972)  offers  
an explanation  for  the wood market  pricing.  If wood buyers  cannot  commit themselves not  to  
change  the price  in the future, the sellers of wood can  postpone  their  decisions to  sell  and  wait 
until the price  eventually  rises. Thus the stable market equilibrium  in  fact converges to the 
level where  the actual  wood price  equals  the value of  the marginal  product  of input, i.e. to 
the competitive  market price.  This reasoning  is  even  more suitable to  the Finnish pulpwood  
market than to  the Swedish one:  the forest  industry  owns  40 % of  the forest  area  in Sweden 
while the respective  share  in Finland is  only  9 %, making  the Finnish forest  industry  far  more  
dependent  on the nonindustrial private  wood supply.  Also,  in previous  studies  on  the Finnish 
wood markets,  price  expectations  have been found to play  a crucial role in explaining  the 
forest owner's  timber selling  behaviour. On  the other hand, the signs  of imperfect  
competition  in the wood chips  market can  be explained  by  the lack  of  countervailing  power 
of independent  sawmills  as compared  to suppliers  of pulpwood.  
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Appendix  1.  Graphs  of  main variables  in the Finnish  pulp  industry,  1965-94. 
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Appendix  2. Parameter estimates for Model A with dummy-variables  included for period 
1975-77 (t-values  in parentheses).  The subscripts  are:  q for pulp,  l for  labour,  w  for wood,  T 
for technological  change,  and K for capital.  
Model A 
Imperfect  
competition +  
Dummy  variables 
-Jx  1.17(15.56)  
Pqq  8.36 (8.39)  
Pn -27.67 (-5.45)  
P\VW  -0.28 (-0.06) 
Pql 2.59 (4.92) 
Pwl  6.05 (4.35) 
Pqw  -8.96 (-4.47) 
<t>qK  0.00(2.61)  
D75
q -1.97 (-6.04)  
D76
q -1.71 (-5.47) 
D77
q -1.76 (-5.77) 
<t>qT  0.10(5.64) 
<t>IK -0.00 (-7.25)  
<j)|T 1.01 (10.58)  
<j>wT -0.33 (-4.44)  
<|>wK  -0.00 (-2.66)  
D75
w
 8.28  (6.24)  
D76
w
 7.44 (5.86)  
D77
w
 7.11 (5.72)  
Equation:  Q 
Adj.R
2
(DW)  0.93  (1.09)  
Equation:  -Xw 
Adj.R
2
(DW)  0.92(1.14)  
Equation:  -Xl 
Adj.R
2
(DW) 0.97 (0.68) 

ISBN 951-40-1592-4  
ISSN 0358-4283  
Hakapaino Oy 1997 
